The Commission has accepted commitments from Microsoft regarding tying concerns related to Teams

The European Commission (the “Commission”) has accepted binding commitments from Microsoft to address competition concerns regarding the tying of Teams with its Office 365 and Microsoft 365 productivity suites, following complaints from competitors and a preliminary finding of abuse of dominance. Microsoft will now inter alia offer the productivity suites without Teams, as well as ensuring interoperability within the suites for Teams’ competitors. This decision may lead to other dominant companies having to reconsider how they develop and package new digital systems.

Background

Teams was launched by Microsoft in 2017 and became widely used during the pandemic. When Teams was launched, Microsoft included it by default in Office 365 and Microsoft 365, its widely used Software-as-a-Service (“SaaS”) productivity suites for business customers. In 2020 and 2024, Slack Technologies (“Slack”) and alfaview GmbH (“Alfaview ”) respectively filed complaints alleging abuse of dominance regarding Microsoft’s actions relating to Teams. Both complainants, which provide communications and video conferencing programs for businesses, complained that Teams was included with Microsoft’s Office 365 and Microsoft 365 suites for business customers, thereby creating anticompetitive effects in the market.

In 2024, the Commission issued its preliminary view, finding that Microsoft had abused its dominant position in the market for SaaS productivity software. The Commission was of the view that by tying Teams to Office 365 and Microsoft 365, Microsoft effectively restricted competition in the market for cloud-based communication and collaboration products, granting Teams an undue competitive advantage in terms of distribution. This advantage was also reinforced by interoperability limitations between Microsoft’s other applications (e.g. Outlook and Word) and communication and collaboration services that compete with Teams. The Commission was concerned that Microsoft had consolidated its dominant position in productivity software by adding Teams to its suites. The tying show great resemblance with the conduct fined by the Commission and later upheld by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Microsoft I judgment, case T-201/04.

The legal framework

Under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission can accept binding commitments from companies under investigation for competition infringements. There are no rules regarding the content of such commitments, but they typically involve behavioural measures (e.g., offering previously bundled products or services separately) and may also include structural measures (e.g., divestiture) although that is rare in relation to alleged antitrust infringements. This mechanism allows both the Commission and companies alike to avoid lengthy and expensive investigations, fines, and subsequent court appeals. Commitments are limited in duration, lasting for a number of years depending on the circumstances.

Article 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003 requires the Commission to provide interested third parties with an opportunity to comment on the proposed commitments before accepting them, a so-called market test. If a company fails to fulfil its binding commitment, Article 23(2)(c) of Regulation 1/2003 grants the Commission the power to impose fines up to 10 % of the company’s global annual revenue.

Microsoft’s commitments

To address the Commission’s preliminary findings, Microsoft proposed offering certain suites without Teams. However, the Commission considered this remedy insufficient to fully resolve its competition concerns.

After months of negotiations with Microsoft, and a subsequent market test, the Commission announced on 12 September 2025 that it had accepted the commitments offered by Microsoft to address its concerns relating to Teams. Microsoft’s final commitments consisted of:

• offering Microsoft 365 and Office 365 suites without Teams at reduced prices;
• providing customers with recurring opportunities to switch to suites without Teams and allowing such suites to be deployed in data centers worldwide;
• enabling interoperability between Teams’ competitors and third parties with specific Microsoft products and services for designated functionalities, while permitting these parties to incorporate Office Web Applications (Word, Excel, and PowerPoint) into their offerings and achieve prominent integration within Microsoft’s core productivity applications;
• allowing customers in the European Economic Area to extract their Teams messaging data for use with competing solutions; and
• committing never to market suites with Teams without simultaneously displaying options for suites without Teams.

These commitments have a duration of seven years, except for those relating to interoperability and data portability, which have a duration of ten years.

Concluding remarks

The Microsoft commitments offer several important learnings.

First, dominant companies providing SaaS applications should make a competition law assessment before releasing new products integrated in their pre-existing services. They may need to design product integration strategies with potential unbundling requirements in mind from the outset.

Second, ensuring interoperability may become mandatory for dominant companies operating closed ecosystems. The Commission appears to be requiring large closed ecosystems to open up by mandating interoperability with competing tools and services (as evidenced by the Commission’s regulatory approach toward Apple’s iOS platform in Case DMA.100203). By requiring such interoperability, the Commission is effectively transforming previously walled gardens into modular systems. Companies may therefore need to develop services with interoperability requirements in mind from the beginning.

Third, negotiated commitments may offer significant strategic advantages. Microsoft was not found guilty of an infringement, thereby avoiding fines, damages claims, and the bad publicity associated with such findings. For certain companies facing antitrust investigations it may be worthwhile to engage in comprehensive negotiations from the outset. The successful market test in the Microsoft-investigation resulted in Slack and Alfaview withdrawing their complaints against Microsoft, demonstrating that well-designed commitments can provide the optimal resolution to an investigation.

However, commitments are not always a feasible solution. Moreover, a company may in certain situations want to fight its innocence to the very last instance. Others may succeed in having the investigation closed at an early stage, without offering commitments or facing any sanctions.

This case demonstrates that the Commission’s scrutiny of large tech companies continues. Companies that hold dominant positions in digital markets should also carefully consider how introducing new services may create competitive concerns in adjacent markets. Delphi has extensive experience advising in abuse of dominance cases, assisting during dawn raids, and supporting companies in antitrust investigations. For professional and experienced guidance on competition law matters, please contact Delphi’s competition team.